ABSTRACT A new paradigm of uplink non-orthogonal multiple access along with multiple eavesdroppers to achieve secrecy transmission is studied in this paper. We investigate the secrecy performance of a single transmitter in both non-colluding-and colluding-eavesdropper scenarios on basis of two decoding methods at the legitimate receiver, zero-forcing (ZF), and minimum mean-square error (MMSE), jointly with successive interference cancellation (SIC). We first evaluate the secrecy performance in three metrics: secrecy outage probability, effective secrecy throughput (EST), and positive secrecy capacity probability. Analytical results show: 1) the collusion of eavesdroppers deteriorates the secrecy performance, which is an affine combination of those regarding each single eavesdropper and 2) MMSE-SIC outperforms ZF-SIC, while the performance gap can be overcome via reducing the number of interferers, or increasing signalto-noise ratio (SNR), or enhancing the spatial diversity gain. We then analyze the asymptotic behaviors of the secrecy performance, revealing the high-SNR secrecy performance for both ZF-SIC and MMSE-SIC approaches to the same result which is location-dependent only. Furthermore, we study the problem of optimal power allocation to each transmitter subject to limited total transmit power. An interesting solution to this problem is demonstrated with the aid of numerical results. Finally, we propose an SIC order scheduling scheme which is conjectured to be optimal in achieving total maximum EST in a high SNR regime.
I. INTRODUCTION A. BACKGROUND AND RELATED WORK
Non-orthogonal multiple access (NOMA) has been widely acknowledged as a promising technology in the fifth generation (5G) mobile communication systems, as it is highly expected to increase system throughput and accommodate massive connectivity [1] - [3] . Different from the traditional orthogonal multiple access (OMA) that exploits the frequency, time or code domain for multiple access, NOMA provides multiple access in the power domain. Ultimately, it offers a significant improvement in spectral efficiency. The key technique for NOMA to perform multiuser decoding is successive interference cancellation (SIC), which mitigates user interference for the next user's decoding, and achieves sum-rate capacity of multiuser [4] . High spectral efficiency partially addresses the problem of an envisioned thousandfold increase in total mobile broadband data; nevertheless, security is another serious issue for the next generation network. Although encryption is available to ensure confidentiality, its computational cost may be prohibitive and there are vulnerabilities and difficulties in key management and distribution [5] . As a result, considerable studies were concerned with physical-layer security for 5G networks [6] - [12] .
Recently, physical-layer security towards NOMA has been received a huge amount of attention. Zhang et al. [13] studied secrecy problems in a single-input single-output (SISO) NOMA system, aiming to maximize the secrecy sum rate of multiple users subject to their quality-of-service (QoS) requirements. Reference [14] investigated the similar optimization problem of the secrecy sum rate for multi-input multi-output (MIMO) NOMA, subject to successful SIC and transmit power constraint. The optimal designs of decoding order, transmission rates, and power allocated to each user for secure downlink NOMA were investigated in [15] . Li et al. [16] and Jiang et al. [17] paired users as a central user (entrusted user) and a cell-edge user (potential eavesdropper).
They focused on the optimization problem of secure beamforming and power allocation to maximize the sum achievable secrecy rate of central users subject to the transmit power constraint and transmission rate requirements at cell-edge users. Qin et al. [18] shifted target to NOMA in large-scale networks and characterized secrecy performance in terms of asymptotic secrecy outage probability (SOP). The authors additionally addressed a multiple-antenna scenario in [19] , where artificial noise is generated at the transmitter for further improving the security of a beamforming-aided system. Reference [20] investigates the secrecy performance of a two-user downlink NOMA systems with different transmit antenna selection (TAS) strategies, achieving the closed-form expressions for the secrecy outage probability, and proposed an effective power allocation scheme to obtain the non-zero secrecy diversity order for all the TAS schemes. A twouser relay NOMA was considered in [21] , where the relay user succeeded in extracting its signals with spectral efficiency improvement and the indirect user was able to attain its privacy information. Reference [22] studied the secrecy performance of two-user relay NOMA by considering the cases of full duplex relay (FDR) and half duplex relay (HDR). The physical layer security for cooperative NOMA systems was also investigated in [23] , where both amplify-andforward (AF) and decode-and-forward (DF) protocols were considered. Reference [24] considered the secrecy problem of a NOMA network with mixed multicasting and unicasting traffic. Different from our work in this paper, all of the work cited above focused on issues from an aspect of downlink.
One early work about multi-user wiretap channels from the perspective of uplink was introduced in [25] , where the authors proposed a novel user scheduling algorithm to achieve the optimal multi-user diversity gain. Further study was done in [26] , by extending to a multi-cell scenario. Reference [27] investigated multi-user scheduling schemes to achieve secrecy performance in terms of secrecy outage probability. In all these three references, only one user is scheduled to transmit data each time, which indicates the multiple access is orthogonal. In contrast, [28] took NOMA into account, yet, the target is the achievable ergodic secrecy sum-rates rather than the secrecy performance of any individual user.
Another special type of uplink multi-user wiretap channels is known as multiple access wiretap channels (MAC-WT), where secure multiple access is possible at the presence of one eavesdropper. In most MAC-WT systems, transmitters adopt superposition coding. In this sense, the MAC-WT is a NOMA system. Ender Tekin et al. first studied Gaussian MAC-WT in [29] , where achievable secrecy rate regions are identified by using Gaussian signaling for degraded Gaussian MAC-WT. Later, they extended it to general Gaussian MAC-WT and remained able to achieve secrecy rate regions based on the Gaussian signaling [30] . However, there is no secure degree of freedom (DoF) for these Gaussian signaling based schemes, which leads to further work on the secure DoF of MAC-WT [31] - [33] . Fading MAC-WT was first introduced in [34] , where the authors still utilized the Gaussian signaling based schemes (together with cooperative jamming) to characterize achievable ergodic secrecy rate regions just as in [29] . Similarly, no secure DoF exists. Yet, two new achievable schemes, scaling-based alignment (SBA) and ergodic secret alignment (ESA), proposed in [35] , were capable of achieving secure DoF for two-user fading MAC-WT. There is still a lot of other literature about the MAC-WT. However, in all the work, the studies in general concentrated on encoding schemes to achieve secrecy rate regions and an upper bound for the secrecy sum-rate. In other words, they basically characterized the setting as a whole for secrecy performance from an information-theoretic perspective, and did not consider any specific decoding methods at the desired receiver.
In [36] , we shifted focus to individual secrecy performance for K -user MAC-WT and employed two specific decoding methods, zero-forcing (ZF) and minimum meansquare error (MMSE), jointly with SIC. We derived the closed-form expressions of secrecy performance in terms of positive secrecy capacity probability, secrecy outage probability and effective secrecy throughput (EST). Valuable sights into the SIC order, signal-to-noise ratios (SNRs) and decoding methods were provided. We later generalized the eavesdropper of the setting from a single-antenna scenario to a multi-antenna one in [37] , where only ZF-SIC was considered for simplicity. In addition to the closed-form expressions of individual secrecy performance, we further proposed one SIC order scheduling scheme based on each user's relative distance to the eavesdropper over the legitimate receiver and gave a solution to the problem of uplink optimal power allocation.
B. MOTIVATION AND CONTRIBUTIONS
In this work, we continue the study of individual secrecy performance by extending one eavesdropper to multiple. The NOMA wiretap channels we consider consist of one legitimate receiver equipped with N antennas, M eavesdroppers and K transmitters, each possessing one single antenna. We address the multiple eavesdroppers with noncolluding and colluding scenarios. In the non-colluding scenario, the system is boiled down to NOMA wiretap channels with the worst eavesdropper. For the colluding scenario, the multiple eavesdroppers can be regarded as one with multiple spatially dispersed antennas. Similar to [36] , two decoding methods, ZF-SIC and MMSE-SIC, are adopted at the legitimate receiver, and the multiple access channels to the legitimate receiver and the eavesdroppers are quasistatic Rayleigh fading. The secrecy performance is also evaluated in terms of secrecy outage probability and effective secrecy throughput as key performance metrics. Different from [37] , we make comparisons of performance for ZF-SIC and MMSE-SIC. In addition, we study the problem of optimal power allocation to each transmitter subject to a limit amount of total transmit power for the colluding scenario, and propose a new SIC order scheduling scheme which is based on each user's max-EST. We conjecture the proposed scheduling scheme is optimal in achieving total max-EST at high SNR.
It is worth mentioning that ZF and MMSE are two typical linear filters in the multi-user communication systems. They are naturally extended to ZF-SIC and MMSE-SIC in NOMA systems, which are also commonly used. Zhao Li et al. [38] studied how to decode interfering signals with fewer receiving antennas by ZF-SIC. In [39] , a MMSE-SIC receiver design was adopted to characterize the performance of the non-regenerative massive MIMO NOMA relay systems. Both ZF-SIC and MMSE-SIC were discussed to illustrate the application and development of the SIC technology in [40] . Actually, both ZF and MMSE have their advantage and disadvantage. ZF removes all interference at the expense of reducing the received SNR. It, thus, achieves poor performance at a low SNR regime, while MMSE maximizes the signal-to-interference-plus-noise ratio (SINR) at all SNR regimes (both low and high SNR regimes) at the cost of high computational complexity. We adopt them for this secure NOMA model to see their impacts on the secrecy performance.
The model of multiple eavesdroppers in this work generalizes the uplink NOMA wiretap setting and makes the secure scenario more practical, as a single-eavesdropper network can be regarded as a special case of a multi-eavesdropper one. Moreover, we reveal the relationships of secrecy performance among single-eavesdropper, non-colluding and colluding scenarios. We believe the problems formed and solved in this work are of great significance. The main challenges of this work: 1) modeling non-colluding and colluding eavesdroppers and characterizing the probability density functions (PDFs) of their SINRs; 2) deriving secrecy performance and disclosing the relationship between these two scenarios; and 3) proving with a special case that the max-EST based SIC order scheduling scheme is optimal.
The primary contributions of this paper are summarized as follows:
• Formulate SIC-based individual secrecy capacity, and derive the cumulative distribution functions (CDFs) of SINRs on basis of ZF-SIC and MMSE-SIC decoding at the legitimate receiver.
• Characterize individual secrecy performance in terms of secrecy outage probability, effective secrecy throughput and positive secrecy capacity probability for the non-colluding and colluding scenarios, disclosing the secrecy performance (except secrecy outage probability) in the colluding scenario is an affine combination of that regarding each eavesdropper.
• Evaluate the impacts of SIC orders, SNR, number of antennas as well as decoding methods on the individual secrecy performance, pointing out MMSE-SIC is superior to ZF-SIC in achieving secrecy performance while the performance gap can be overcome by 1) reducing the number of interferers; 2) increasing SNR; or 3) enhancing the spatial diversity gain.
• Investigate the asymptotic behaviors of individual secrecy performance for both non-colluding and colluding scenarios, revealing the secrecy performance for both ZF-SIC and MMSE-SIC approaches to the same results and is only location-dependent at high SNR.
• Study the problem of optimal power allocation to each user under the constraint of total transmit power, and give an interesting solution to this optimization problem.
• Propose a new SIC order scheduling scheme and conjecture the scheme is optimal in achieving total maximum EST in the high SNR regime. The rest of the paper is organized as: In the upcoming section, we model uplink NOMA wiretap channels. Preliminaries are presented in Section III. Section IV and V investigate secrecy performance for the non-colluding and colluding scenarios, respectively. Asymptotic behaviors are analyzed in Section VI. Section VII addresses the problem of optimal power allocation. One SIC order scheduling scheme is proposed in Section VIII. Numerical results are presented in Section IX. Finally, we end up with a conclusion in Section X.
Notation: Vectors and matrices are symbolized by a bold font. I m denotes the m × m identity matrix; || · || and (·) H are the operators of the Euclidean norm and the Hermitian transpose, respectively. Sets are denoted by a script font. A\B denotes the set A minus the set B, ∅ is the empty set, and | · | indicates the cardinality of a set. CN , Exp and χ 2 m specifies the circular symmetric complex Gaussian distribution, the exponential distribution and the chi-squared distribution with m degrees of freedom, respectively. (·, ·) specifies the incomplete gamma function, log is the base 2 logarithm, and
II. SYSTEM MODEL
Consider secure uplink NOMA communications in a single cell, as depicted in Fig. 1 , where K single-antenna users (U 1 , . . . , U K ) transmit their confidential messages to an N -antenna base station (BS) through quasi-static Rayleigh fading channels with the existence of M singleantenna eavesdroppers (E 1 , . . . , E M ). Here, K users are performing NOMA. Different from OMA, such as TDMA, FDMA or CDMA, NOMA allows users to share the same radio resource. Suppose N ≥ K and N ≥ M . For all k ∈ K {1, . . . , K } and j ∈ M {1, . . . , M }, we put forward notation descriptions as follows:
• Let x k and P k be the signal and transmit power from U k .
• Denote h k ∼ CN (0, δ 2 k I N ) and g kj ∼ CN (0, σ 2 kj ) as the N × 1 main channel gain vector from U k to the BS, and the eavesdropper's channel gain from U k to E j , respectively.
• Denote n ∼ CN (0, N b I N ) and w j ∼ CN (0, N e ) as the complex Gaussian noise at the BS and E j , respectively.
•
, i.e., the reciprocals of the average received SNRs from U k at the BS (on each diversity branch) and E j , respectively. Clearly, the main and eavesdropper's channels can be described by
where y and z j are the instantaneous composite signals received at the BS and E j , respectively. In this NOMA system, the BS employs SIC for multiuser decoding, with which the already-decoded user's data will be eliminated from the composite signal in decoding the next user at each iteration of cancellation. In general, the composite signal left before decoding U k at the BS can be formulated as,
where ⊆ K\ {k} is the user set (index) being decoded after U k during an SIC process. When = K\ {k}, (3) is equivalent to (1), specifying U k is decoded at first. = ∅ means no interference term in (3), implying U k is decoded at last.
As for the eavesdroppers, we make a conservative assumption that all user interference can be eliminated before decoding one certain user. Similar assumption can be found in [41] . As a result, there are only a desired signal (e.g. from U k ) and Gaussian noise left at each eavesdropper. Thus, (2) is reduced to
According to [42] , in the quasi-static fading channels, the achievable instantaneous secrecy capacity is the difference between the instantaneous capacities of main and eavesdropper's channels. As such, the instantaneous secrecy capacity for U k is given by
where
and C e,k = log(1 + ξ k ) are the corresponding instantaneous capacities of the main and eavesdropper's channels for U k . The superscript indicates the dependence of the order of SIC decoding.
However, the SINR of U k at the BS (i.e., γ ( ) k ) not only depends on an SIC order, but also depends on a certain decoding method. In this work, we consider two decoding methods which are specialized to ZF and MMSE.
On the other hand, the SINR ξ k varies from scenarios for these multiple eavesdroppers. In the sequel, we address two scenarios: non-colluding and colluding.
III. PRELIMINARIES
In this section, we derive the CDFs of γ ( ) k under two specific decoding methods, i.e., ZF-SIC and MMSE-SIC, at the BS.
A. ZF-SIC
The main idea of ZF-SIC decoding is to remove the user interference by projection at each iteration of an SIC process. We have achieved in [37] 
Denote the cardinality | | with n, number of interferers, and rewrite γ
The MMSE-SIC decoding primarily aims to maximize the output SINR by whitening the complex circular symmetric colored noise z ( ) = i∈ h i x i + n in (3). The SINR is given by [4] 
To simplify the notation, ρ
k,mmse is used from here on.
As far as the statistic of ρ ( ) k is concerned, the problem is to find the distribution of this quadratic form in (7) . With the aid of [43] , we can get the CDF of this SINR, which is formulated as,
where,
Here C i is the coefficient of (9) into (8), one can divide the outcome into two parts. The first part is exactly the same as (6) that is relevant only to the cardinality of , while the extra term in the second part is highly dependent on the average received SNRs at the BS from the user set .
To reduce the complexity of derivations later, we further make an assumption that the average received SNRs from all users at the BS are the same, which means all λ i , ∀i ∈ K, are identical. Such an assumption does not harm the analysis in this work. Actually, such a scenario exists in the interference-limited systems, which require strict power control, e.g., CDMA system. As a result, A ( )
Here, the superscript of A ( ) m (ρ k ) has been replaced with its cardinality n automatically, as it is independent of the specific user(s) in the set.
In the next two sections, we investigate the individual secrecy performance, called secrecy performance for short hereinafter, in terms of secrecy outage probability, effective secrecy throughput and positive secrecy capacity probability, on basis of ZF-SIC and MMSE-SIC for the non-colluding and colluding scenarios, respectively.
IV. NON-COLLUDING EAVESDROPPERS
In the scenario of non-colluding eavesdroppers, each eavesdropper intercepts data independently. Hence, the overall individual secrecy performance (e.g. U k ) is constrained by its worst eavesdropper. However, we do not know who is the worst eavesdropper initially. To obtain the overall secrecy performance, we first derive the secrecy performance regarding each single eavesdropper separately. Then, the worst-case secrecy performance is exactly the overall secrecy performance. In turn, we can also know who is the worst eavesdropper.
Given the expression in (4), the received SINR (with
with the mean of 1/µ kj . Since g kj is a complex Gaussian random variable, |g kj | 2 is exponentially distributed. As such, ξ kj is an exponentially distributed random variable, i.e., ξ kj ∼ Exp(µ kj ). Thus, the probability density function of ξ kj is,
A. SINGLE-EAVESDROPPER SECRECY PERFORMANCE FOR ZF-SIC
In this subsection, we examine the case of ZF-SIC. Three secrecy performance metrics are adopted.
1) SECRECY OUTAGE PROBABILITY
The secrecy outage probability is defined as the probability of secrecy capacity that is less than a predefined secrecy rate.
Here, it can be formulated as
s,kj denotes U k 's secrecy capacity under the threat of E j only. By the way, we follow the notation convention by rewriting the superscript with n.
We present the closed-form expression of the secrecy outage probability in the following theorem.
Theorem 1: The secrecy outage probability of an individual user U k with the presence of E j for the case of ZF-SIC can be expressed as
Since (µ, λ, R s , n) decreases monotonically with the increment of n, P so,kj (n, R s ) is an increasing function of n.
From the proof process in Appendix A, we can easily obtain P so,kj (n, R s ) is an increasing function of R s . Yet, as (µ, λ, R s , n) is an increasing function of µ, P so,kj (n, R s ) declines with µ kj increasing. Additionally, the spatial diversity gain exists, as the increment of N lowers P so,kj (n, R s ).
As opposed to the secrecy outage probability, the secrecy transmission probability can be formulated as
Obviously, it is a decreasing function of n and/or R s , and increases with µ kj .
2) EFFECTIVE SECRECY THROUGHPUT
Recall from [44] that EST is defined as the product of a secrecy rate and the corresponding secrecy transmission probability to evaluate an average secrecy rate at which messages are transmitted to the intended receiver confidentially. To this end, we have
It is worth pointing out the definition here is a little different from the secrecy throughput defined in [45] and [46] . In [45] , the normalized secrecy throughput was defined as the achieved probability of secrecy times the ratio of the number of channel realizations whose information is securely transmitted to the total number of channel realizations, while [46] defined the secrecy throughput as the multiplication of a target secrecy rate and the probability that the achievable rate at the legitimate receiver is greater than the target secrecy rate. The same is that all these different definitions of secrecy throughput show the existence of a tradeoff between the target secrecy rate and the secrecy throughput.
Apparently, T kj (n, R s ) has monotonicity over n and µ kj . Specifically, it is a decreasing function of n while an increasing function of µ kj . Yet, the monotonicity over R s does not exist. Since P st,kj (n, R s ) is an exponentially decaying function of R s , multiplying it with R s makes the product rise at first and then decline quickly with R s increasing. As a result, there must exist a maximum value for this EST regarding R s . Besides, the spatial diversity gain also exists in this metric such that the increment of N increases T kj (n, R s ).
Intuitively, the optimal secrecy rate, denoted as R * (n) s , to achieve the maximum EST (max-EST) varies from different n. R * (n) s with a small n is greater than that with a big one, because P st,kj (n, R s ) decays more slowly with a small n.
The max-EST for this case is denoted as
3) POSITIVE SECRECY CAPACITY PROBABILITY
The positive secrecy capacity probability regarding E j is formulated as P ps,kj (n) = Pr(C (n) s,kj > 0), which can be derived from the secrecy outage probability above.
Interestingly, one can evaluate this secrecy performance metric from the perspective of locations. Note that
, where d b,k is the distance between U k and the BS, d e,kj is the distance between U k and E j , and α is the path-loss exponent. Then, (18) can be transformed into
We note the positive secrecy capacity probability of U k is only dependent on its relative distance to E j over the BS, besides the number of interferers (n) and N . It has nothing to do with its power as well as other users', which makes it possible for the BS to calculate the positive secrecy capacity probability for each legitimate user in its cell against a potential eavesdropper (who might be switched from a legitimate user such that the BS also knows its location) according to their locations.
B. SINGLE-EAVESDROPPER SECRECY PERFORMANCE FOR MMSE-SIC
We shift the decoding method to MMSE-SIC to continue the evaluation of the secrecy performance for these three metrics.
1) SECRECY OUTAGE PROBABILITY
The derivation follows the same steps as in Appendix A by replacing F γ
Before showing the results, we first make a function definition of U (k, λ) = ∞ 0 e −λx (1+x) k dx. Theorem 2: With MMSE-SIC decoding, the individual secrecy outage probability with respect to one specific eavesdropper can be formulated as (20) where
The function U (k, λ) can be calculated via repeated integration by parts when k ≤ 0, otherwise, the result can be looked up from [47, 
Here, Ei (x) is the exponential integral function, which has the following definition,
Observing (20), one can note the secrecy performance in this metric for MMSE-SIC outperforms that for ZF-SIC, as (µ kj , λ k , R s , n) is positive. Similar to the case of ZF-SIC, P † so,kj (n, R s ) is an increasing function of n and R s , and reduces with µ kj increasing.
Given the above result, it is easy to achieve the corresponding expressions regarding secrecy transmission probability,
Note the utilization of the notations follows the previous convention by adding superscript †. VOLUME 6, 2018 Accordingly, the expression of EST for this case can be formulated by
Clearly, T † kj (n, R s ) has a gain over T kj (n, R s ). It is a decreasing function of n, and it increases monotonically with µ kj and exists a maximum value regarding R s . The expression for the max-EST is denoted as
For this decoding method, we can obtain the spatial diversity gain for EST as well, since T † kj (n, R s ) increases with N increasing, which we can see more clearly from Fig. 5 in Section IX.
3) POSITIVE SECRECY CAPACITY PROBABILITY
The positive secrecy capacity probability can be derived easily from the corresponding secrecy transmission probability by setting R s = 0,
Likewise, MMSE-SIC precedes ZF-SIC and a decrement of n increases the secrecy performance in this secrecy metric.
C. OVERALL SECRECY PERFORMANCE
As mentioned at the beginning of this section, the overall secrecy performance is equivalent to the worst-case secrecy performance regarding each single eavesdropper, i.e.,
Here, the superscript nc indicates ''non-colluding'' while co for ''colluding'' in the next section.
Due to the consistency of the above three secrecy metrics, the eavesdropper that satisfies the equations above for one metric would satisfy the equations for the other two metrics. Such an eavesdropper is called the worst eavesdropper. Therefore, the overall secrecy performance for the noncolluding scenario is boiled down to the individual secrecy performance regarding the worst eavesdropper.
We take a deep insight into the worst eavesdropper. Observing (16), the subscript j in T kj (n, R s ) is only related to µ kj . Recall T kj (n, R s ) increases monotonically with µ kj . Thus, the worst eavesdropper has µ k = min j∈M µ kj . The result shows the worst eavesdropper can be found by looking for the minimum element from set µ kj j∈M , i.e., the maximum value of average received SNR at each eavesdropper. In other words, the worst eavesdropper has the maximum value of average received SNR, which indeed conforms to our understanding. Similar conclusion can be drawn in the MMSE-SIC case as it is independent of decoding methods at BS.
For the path-loss model, µ kj is proportional to the distance between U k and E j . Thus, the worst eavesdropper to U k means the nearest eavesdropper to it.
By default, the omission of a subscript (e.g., j) regarding a specific eavesdropper indicates a notation is regarding the worst eavesdropper later. For instance, µ k is associated with the worst eavesdropper of U k .
V. COLLUDING EAVESDROPPERS
In this scenario, M eavesdroppers are cooperative, and they can be regarded as one eavesdropper with multiple dispersed antennas. Performing maximal ratio combining (MRC), it has
. . , ξ kM are independently but nonidentically exponentially distributed.
The PDF of ξ k can be obtained from [48] 
A. SECRECY PERFORMANCE FOR ZF-SIC 1) SECRECY OUTAGE PROBABILITY Following the same statement format, we give the result in the form of a theorem. Theorem 3: In the case of collusion, the secrecy outage probability of an individual user U k with ZF-SIC is given by
Proof: See Appendix C.
It is straightforward to know from the derivation process in Appendix C that P co so,k (n, R s ) is an increasing function of n and R s , which is similar to that for the non-colluding case. P co so,k (n, R s ) is much higher than P so,kj (n, R s ) for any j ∈ M, due to the result of the collusion among these eavesdroppers. As expected, P co so,k (n, R s ) increases with the increment of number of colluding eavesdroppers.
To get a further insight into the secrecy performance, we transform (29) into the form below.
More interestingly, M r=1 a kr = 1, which can be proved by means of the mathematical induction. We omit the process of proof here. Recalling P st,kr (n, R s ) = (µ kr , λ k , R s , n), ∀r ∈ M, the secrecy transmission probability for this case (denoted as P co st,k (n, R s )) is an affine combination of those regarding each single eavesdropper.
It is worth mentioning that the coefficients a k1 , . . . , a kM are not all positive. Actually, there are M /2 (integer) of them negative, which we are able to prove quickly. Briefly, since the index for each eavesdropper is independent of the secrecy performance, without loss of generality, we assume µ k1 < µ k2 , . . . , < µ kM . Thus, a k2 , a k4 , . . . are negative, and the total number is an integer of M /2.
2) EFFECTIVE SECRECY THROUGHPUT
The expression of EST for this case is derived accordingly as follows
Apparently, T co k (n, R s ) is an affine combination of each single-eavesdropper EST. However, the negative coefficients make T co k (n, R s ) less than any single-eavesdropper EST (T kj (n, R s ), j ∈ M).
Observing (32), we can note if Similar to the case of a single eavesdropper, the max-EST exists and the optimal secrecy rate to achieve it varies from different n. More details can be found in Section IX. The expression for the max-EST is denoted as T co max,k (n, R * (n) s ). Yet, the function is not limited to the arguments of n and R * (n) s . Actually, it is also a function of power P k . For subsequent use, we rewrite it as T co max,k (n, P k ) in advance.
3) POSITIVE SECRECY CAPACITY PROBABILITY
The positive secrecy capacity probability is easily derived from the secrecy outage probability, which is showed as
It is also an affine combination of the positive secrecy capacity probability regarding each eavesdropper for ZF-SIC.
B. SECRECY PERFORMANCE FOR MMSE-SIC 1) SECRECY OUTAGE PROBABILITY
The expression of secrecy outage probability in the case of MMSE-SIC is provided by, Theorem 4: In the scenario of collusion, the secrecy outage probability of an individual user for MMSE-SIC is given by
(34)
Proof: See Appendix D. As expected, MMSE-SIC also has an advantage over ZF-SIC in terms of secrecy outage probability for the colluding scenario, since the second term in (34) is positive.
Recall (µ kr , λ k , R s , n), ∀r ∈ M, is the gain of MMSE-SIC over ZF-SIC for the secrecy outage probability regarding a single eavesdropper E r . Thus the gain obtained here is an affine combination of those regarding each eavesdropper.
As we know, secrecy transmission probability is a complement of secrecy outage probability. Substituting (29) into (34) and carrying out simple calculations, we have
It is easy to note the secrecy transmission probability for MMSE-SIC in the colluding scenario is an affine combination of those regarding each single eavesdropper.
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The corresponding EST is derived as
The gain of MMSE-SIC over ZF-SIC in terms of EST is reflected at the second term in step two above. Similarly, the gain obtained here is an affine combination of those regarding each single eavesdropper. However, such a gain is less than that in (25) . Furthermore, the performance for MMSE-SIC in this metric is also an affine combination of those regarding each single eavesdropper.
Following the convention, T †co max,k (n, R * (n) s ) denotes the expression of the max-EST in this case.
3) POSITIVE SECRECY CAPACITY PROBABILITY
Likewise, we achieve the following result from the related secrecy outage probability.
Similarly, both the secrecy performance for MMSE-SIC and the gain over ZF-SIC in this metric can be expressed in the form of affine combinations.
Remark 1: In the colluding scenario, the secrecy performance (excluding secrecy outage probability) can be expressed as an affine combination of those regarding each single eavesdropper for the same decoding methods. Moreover, the performance gains of MMSE-SIC over ZF-SIC are also an affine combination of those regarding each single eavesdropper.
Remark 2: Although it is hard to figure out the relationship between the secrecy performance and the number of BS antennas N from the expressions directly, we can achieve it numerically. From Fig. 5 in Section IX, we obtain there exist spatial diversity gains in this scenario. Moreover, the performance gap between MMSE-SIC and ZF-SIC can be reduced with N increasing.
VI. ASYMPTOTIC ANALYSIS
In this section, we analyze the asymptotic behaviors of the secrecy performance at the extreme values of N and SNR for both the non-colluding and colluding scenarios.
A. NON-COLLUDING SCENARIO
Let us start from the asymptotic behaviors with the extreme value of N first. When N → ∞ for (6) and (8), both F γ
(ρ k ) approach to 0. From the processes of proof in Appendix A and B, we obtain,
Thus, the asymptotic expressions of EST for the both methods are formulated as
where the optimal secrecy rate is limited to the related main capacity.
We move on to the asymptotic behaviors with the extreme value of SNR.
By setting the average received SNR from U k at the BS (one diversity branch, denoted by SNR b,k ) as the benchmark, the corresponding average received SNR at the worst eavesdropper is specified as SNR e,k = β k SNR b,k , i.e., λ k /µ k = β k . Hereinafter, the ''SNR'' refers in particular to SNR b,k .
Assuming the ratio β k is a non-zero value, with SNR approaching to ∞, λ k and µ k approach to 0. Consequently, we achieve the following asymptotic result from (13) in the high SNR regime,
The asymptotic expression for the EST can be obtained accordingly,
Although MMSE-SIC has a gain over ZF-SIC in secrecy performance, such a gain is vanished when the SNR approaches to ∞. Actually, the second term in (20) or (27) disappears, even when we loosen our assumption of identical average SNR for all users in Subsection III-B. Hence, the asymptotic expressions of these three secrecy performance metrics for MMSE-SIC have the same results as those for ZF-SIC. We change to express them from the perspective of locations for the pathloss model by replacing 1/β k with
B. COLLUDING SCENARIO
Since the asymptotic behaviors are the same as those for the non-colluding scenario with the extreme value of N , we do not repeat them again. According to the previous analysis in Subsection VI-
, R s ), ∀i ∈ M, with SNR approaching to ∞. Note the ratio β ki = λ k /µ ki (∀i ∈ M) is assumed to be non-zero. Then, we achieve the asymptotic results as follows.
Since (µ ki , λ k , R s , n) → 0, ∀i ∈ M, with SNR approaching to ∞, the second term of (34) is approximately equal to 0 at high SNR, and we have
Similar to the non-colluding scenario, the secrecy performance for all these three metrics approaches to the same results, no matter whether ZF-SIC or MMSE-SIC is adopted.
Moreover, the asymptotic results can also be transformed into the form of relative distances for the path-loss model. Specifically, we can re-express the expressions in the form of relative distances just by substituting (41), (42) and (43) . Therefore, the asymptotic secrecy performance in this scenario is determined by the relative distances to all the eavesdroppers over the BS. Consequently, we can re-express T co (as) 
, to explicitly reflect the parameters about relative distances.
Remark 3: The high-SNR individual secrecy performance for both ZF-SIC and MMSE-SIC approaches to the same results which are location-dependent only for the both scenarios in the pathloss mode.
VII. OPTIMAL POWER ALLOCATION
This section investigates the problem of optimal power allocation to each user to achieve the most total max-EST, subject to a limited amount of total power P total . Due to the assumption of identical average received SNR for each user at the BS for the case of MMSE-SIC, the power allocation is just subject to the assumption. Hence, we only address the problem in the case of ZF-SIC. Moreover, we merely focus on the scenario of collusion, as the non-colluding scenario can be regarded as a special case of collusion.
Without loss of generality, we assume the SIC order is U K → . . . → U 2 → U 1 , which means the number of interferers (n) for U k is k − 1, ∀k ∈ K.
Consequently, the problem can be formulated as follows,
The method of Lagrange multipliers is an appropriate way to solve this class of optimization problems. The Lagrange function is given by
where L is a Lagrange multiplier.
Let the partial derivatives of L(P 1 , . . . , P K , L) with respect to P k (∀k ∈ K) be 0, yielding
One can note the optimal solution (P * 1 , P * 2 , . . . , P * K ) makes all of the derivatives identical to each other. Yet, power should not be negative, hence, the optimal power is referred to as [P * k ] + , which is subject to
can be found numerically. We will demonstrate it more detailed in Subsection IX-E.
VIII. MAX-EST BASED SIC ORDER SCHEDULING
In [37] , we put forward an SIC order scheduling scheme, called alternative scheme, which schedules users according to each user's relative distance to the only eavesdropper over the BS from the shortest to the longest. We have proved that the scheme is optimal in achieving the most total max-EST in the high SNR regime. Obviously, the alternative scheme can be adopted for the non-colluding scenario, as the overall noncolluding secrecy performance is determined by the worst eavesdropper. Nevertheless, the above scheduling scheme is non applicable for the colluding scenario.
In this section, we propose a new SIC order scheduling scheme, which is applicable for both non-colluding and colluding scenarios. We name it max-EST based scheme. The scheme sorts the users' SIC order according to each user's max-EST (at the same n) from the lowest to the highest.
According to the asymptotic analysis in Subsection VI-A, in the high SNR regime, the relative distance to the worst VOLUME 6, 2018 eavesdropper completely determines the non-colluding max-EST, which is monotonically increasing. Therefore, the max-EST based scheme for non-colluding scenario is equivalent to the alternative scheme (each user's relative distance to the worst eavesdropper over the BS from the shortest to the longest). As such, the max-EST based scheme is optimal in achieving the most total max-EST in the high SNR regime for the non-colluding scenario.
As far as the colluding scenario is concerned, we conjecture that max-EST based scheme would also achieve the most total max-EST in the high SNR regime.
For simplicity, we re-express the asymptotic (SNR) max-EST max 
To prove the conjecture, we need to prove any other SIC orders different from the optimal order would achieve less total max-EST.
From the concept of permutation, any other SIC orders can be achieved from the optimal order via several steps of inversion. An inversion operation refers to an exchange of two members (in a permutation, original or new) that results in the two members having a different ''position'' relation from that in the original permutation. For instance, in the original permutation, A is ahead of B, and an exchange of A and B in a permutation is an inversion operation if it leads to B ahead of A. We further take a 4-user order (permutation) to demonstrate it more specifically. To achieve the order (permutation) of U 3 U 4 U 2 U 1 (i.e., U 3 → U 4 → U 2 → U 1 ) from the original order (permutation) of U 1 U 2 U 3 U 4 , three steps of inversion are enough:
In the first step, the inversion operation results in the exchange of U 1 and U 3 ; the exchange of U 2 and U 4 in the second step is an inversion operation as U 2 is ahead of U 4 in the original order (permutation); in the last step, the inversion takes place with the exchange between U 1 and U 2 . Therefore, if we can prove any inversion operation originated from the optimal order would lead to less total max-EST, then the proof is done.
With the assumption of
in the optimal SIC order, and q > p. An inversion of U i and U j makes U j (n = q) ahead of U i (n = p) in the new SIC order. The difference of total max-EST between before and after the inversion is T co (as) It is about the relationship between the gap of the asymptotic max-EST for two different n (p and q) and the relative distance vectors (d r,j and d r,i ) .
Although the asymptotic max-EST T co (as) max (n, d r ) (subscript specifying a user is omitted for generality) is determined by the relative distance vector, it is still difficult to prove the above inequality in (46) . Nevertheless, we can confirm the conjecture by one special case that only one dimension of the M -vector d r is variable. Firstly, the asymptotic max-EST is a monotonically increasing function of one variable relative distance (others fixed). Meanwhile, we note the gap of the asymptotic max-EST for any two different n increases with one relative distance (others fixed) increasing. Such an interesting property can be viewed from Fig. 2 , where there are three colluding eavesdroppers and two relative distances (the αth power) are fixed to 1 and 0.6, and the number of antennas at the BS and the number of eavesdroppers are assumed to be 10 and 3 respectively, i.e., N = 10 and M = 3. The corresponding derivatives of these curves with respect to the variable relative distance are plotted in Fig. 3 , which shows a lower n has a higher slope for any relative distance point at the coordinate axis. From this special case, we can verify the inequality in (46) is satisfied.
IX. NUMERICAL RESULTS
Numerical results are presented in this section. As mentioned previously, there are correlations among these three secrecy metrics. To limit the length of this work, we demonstrate the numerical results in terms of EST only. The number of antennas at the BS and the number of eavesdroppers are assumed to be 10 and 3 respectively, i.e., N = 10 and M = 3, if not specified otherwise throughout this section.
A. IMPACTS OF SIC ORDERS AND SNR
In this part, we examine the impacts of SIC orders and SNR on the secrecy performance. In Fig. 4 , we show the colluding EST with respect to R s for different values of n and SNR. The analytical curves in Fig. 4 are generated based on (32) and (36) , where three eavesdroppers are supposed and the ratio of average SNR for each eavesdropper is β k1 = 0.6, β k2 = 0.8 and β k3 = 1, respectively. The number of antennas at the BS is set to 5. One can obtain the following observations for the both decoding methods:
• Given n and SNR, the EST curves go up first and then descend regarding R s .
• An increment of number of interferers n worsens the EST. The lowest value of n has the most EST, while the highest achieves the least EST.
• High SNR improves the EST.
The first observation confirms the inference in Subsection V-A2 and V-B2 that there exists a maximum value for each EST curve, namely T co max,k (n, R * (n)
s ). Another confirmation is also conducted that the optimal secrecy rate R * (n) s to achieve the maximum EST for each curve is different. Here, we take the case of ZF-SIC in Fig. 4(b) to illustrate it specifically. The optimal secrecy rates for the cases of n = 1, 2 as well as 4 are 1.3, 1.1 and 0.7 bps/Hz, respectively. The less n, the higher R * (n) s , which is applicable to MMSE-SIC.
Another important phenomenon is that the performance gap between ZF-SIC and MMSE-SIC is shrunk with the decrement of n and/or the increment of SNR. Fig. 4(d) shows that when the SNR is equal to 10 dB, the EST curves with either n = 1 or n = 2 for MMSE-SIC are almost overlapped by the corresponding curves for ZF-SIC. In particular, ZF-SIC is the same as MMSE-SIC when n is equal to 0.
B. COMPARISONS OF COLLUDING AND NON-COLLUDING EST
In Fig. 5 , we make EST comparisons between the colluding and non-colluding scenarios. We generate the curves of EST regarding every single eavesdropper based on MMSE-SIC while achieve colluding EST curves for both ZF-SIC and MMSE-SIC. It is straightforward to obtain that EST regarding each eavesdropper decreases with the ratio of average SNR (β k1 , β k2 and β k3 ) increasing. Here, the black dotted curve represents the overall non-colluding EST, as the corresponding eavesdropper is the worst of all. Additionally, the colluding EST (red solid line) is less than that regarding any single eavesdropper for any amount of antennas at the BS. The cause is obvious that the collusion with other eavesdroppers (E 1 and E 2 ) deteriorates the secrecy performance. As expected, with β k1 and β k2 scaling higher, i.e., β k1 and β k2 from 0.1 and 0.3 to 0.2 and 0.6, respectively, the EST gap between the colluding and non-colluding scenarios enlarges, which can be viewed from Fig. 5(b) to Fig. 5(c) . On the other hand, we also notice from Fig. 5(a) to Fig. 5(b) (or from Fig. 5(c) to Fig. 5(d) ) the EST increases with the increment of BS antennas. Moreover, the colluding EST gap between ZF-SIC and MMSE-SIC is reduced by increasing the number of antennas at the BS. Even with only 10 antennas, the EST curves for both ZF-SIC and MMSE-SIC almost overlap with each other. As such, we can directly adopt low-complexity ZF-SIC instead of high-complexity MMSE-SIC at a moderate number of antennas without losing performance. The above observations show the spatial diversity gain is achievable for the both scenarios, and can overcome the performance gap between ZF-SIC and MMSE-SIC.
Note the numerical results achieved here are based on an assumption of n = 2 and SNR = 0 dB. For the case of other values of n and SNR, we can obtain the similar conclusions.
C. OPTIMAL SECRECY RATE ESTIMATION
In the high SNR regime, as pointed out in Subsection VI, the individual secrecy performance for these two scenarios is only determined by its relative distance to each eavesdropper over the BS. In other words, as long as U k knows its relative distance to each eavesdropper, it is capable of calculating its optimal secrecy rate to reach the maximum EST. Actually, it is difficult for U k to get the information of each eavesdropper's location. Fortunately, in the model of this work, U k can get the optimal secrecy rate without knowing the location of each eavesdropper.
We illustrate it with the aids of Fig. 6 . In Fig. 6 , there are three busy users (U 1 , . . . , U 3 ) communicating with the BS and two idle users (E 1 and E 2 ), who are the potential eavesdroppers to the other busy users. Since the BS knows the location information of all the users (both busy and idle users) in its cell, it can compute the distances from each busy user to all the eavesdroppers (idle users), and in turn estimate the optimal secrecy rates for all the busy users instead. To this end, each legitimate (busy) user is allowed to adjust its secrecy rate easily in the light of an instruction from the BS to achieve the maximum EST. We list the relative distances to all the eavesdroppers for each legitimate user in table 1, according to the topology in Fig. 6 .
In the case of the non-colluding scenario, the BS only needs to calculate each user's relative distance to its worst eavesdropper. E 1 is the worst eavesdropper to U 1 and U 2 , while E 2 is the worst eavesdropper to U 3 . For the colluding scenario, the BS needs to calculate the relative distances of U k to all the eavesdroppers (rather than to the worst eavesdropper only) so as to estimate its optimal secrecy rate.
D. SIC ORDER SCHEDULING
With the relative distances in Table 1 , we can obtain the values of max-EST and the optimal secrecy rates for each user via numerical root-finding for all possible n. Table 2 is for the case of the non-colluding scenario. The values of total max-EST for all possible SIC orders are showed in Table 3 . Here, the path-loss exponent α is set to 2.1. From the BS's perspective of the maximization of the total max-EST, the optimal SIC decoding order among these legitimate users is U 1 (n = 2) → U 3 (n = 1) → U 2 (n = 0), i.e., scheduling from the user with the shortest relative distance (lowest max-EST) to the one with the longest (highest), which confirms our analysis in Section VIII. The values of max-EST achieved for U 1 , U 2 , U 3 are 1.8425, 2.4557 and 2.1525 bits/s/Hz, respectively, and the corresponding optimal rates for U 1 , U 2 , U 3 are 2.79, 3.31 and 3.05 bits/s/Hz, respectively. As opposed to the optimal SIC order, there is a worst SIC order, i.e., U 2 → U 3 → U 1 , as it has the most steps of inversion originated from the optimal SIC order.
For the colluding scenario, we also list the values of max-EST for each user for different n, and the values of total max-EST for all possible SIC orders via numerical root-finding in Table 4 and 5, respectively. It is easy to note the SIC order U 1 → U 3 → U 2 has the most total max-EST, which confirms the conjecture in Section VIII. As expected, the SIC order U 2 → U 3 → U 1 achieves the least total max-EST. By the way, the optimal SIC order for the colluding scenario is identical to that for the non-colluding scenario by chance here. 
E. OPTIMAL POWER ALLOCATION
We continue the case in Fig. 6 to numerically demonstrate the problem of optimal power allocation to each user (legitimate) with the constraint of limited total transmit power for the colluding scenario.
Suppose the noise power at both the BS (one diversity branch) and each eavesdropper is −90 dBm, i.e., N b = N e = −90 dBm, and the path loss in dB: L = 10α lg(d) + 53.5, where d is the distance in meter and the path-loss exponent is still α = 2.1. The length of each grid in Fig. 6 is assumed to be 20 meters. Based on the above assumptions, we can numerically obtain the derivatives of max-EST with respect to power for all these three users, which are mapped into the same coordinate axis in Fig. 7 . Note the SIC order of these users is scheduled optimally, i.e., U 1 → U 3 → U 2 .
According to (45) in Section VII, the condition for the optimal power allocation solution is that each user has the same derivative of the max-EST at its allocated power and number of interferers n. Concretely, T max,1 (2 
Derivatives of max-EST with respect to power.
(k = 1, 2, 3). Obviously, the optimal power allocation solution can be found by moving the baseline in Fig. 7 to make the sum of each corresponding power meet the amount of total transmit power. For example, the optimal allocation of the total transmit power of 1 mW, i.e., P total = 1 mW, is to adjust the baseline to the position of the blue solid line, where [P * 1 ] + = 0 mW, P * 2 = 0.65 mW, P * 3 = 0.35 mW. To allocate P total = 2 mW, moving the baseline to the position of the green dashed line can achieve the optimal power allocation solution for these three users, correspondingly, P * 1 = 0.32 mW, P * 2 = 0.98 mW and P * 3 = 0.7 mW. The black dashdotted line is the position for the optimal solution to P total = 3 mW, where P * 1 = 0.62 mW, P * 2 = 1.28 mW and P * 3 = 1.1 mW. One can get all optimal power allocation solutions to other values of total power.
X. CONCLUSION
In this work, we considered the quasi-static Rayleigh fading uplink NOMA multi-eavesdropper wiretap channels. We investigated the secrecy performance of an individual user, whose decoding methods at the BS are specialized to ZF-SIC and MMSE-SIC, for both the non-colluding and colluding scenarios. The closed-form expressions of secrecy performance were derived in terms of secrecy outage probability, effective secrecy throughput and positive secrecy capacity probability. With the aid of the closedform expressions and numerical results, we provided valuable insights into the impacts of SIC orders, SNR as well as the spatial diversity (i.e., N ) on the individual secrecy performance, and made comprehensive comparisons between the two scenarios. As expected, the secrecy performance in the non-colluding scenario outperforms that in the colluding scenario. Another comparison between ZF-SIC and MMSE-SIC showed that the latter could achieve better secrecy performance than the former, while the performance gap can be overcome by a low number of interferers n, or high SNR, or a sufficient spatial diversity gain. Interestingly, at either scenario, with high SNR, the individual secrecy performance for the both decoding methods approaches to the same result which is only determined by the relative distances to all the eavesdroppers over the BS. Furthermore, we studied the problem of optimal power allocation to each user in achieving the most total max-EST in the case of ZF-SIC for the colluding scenario. Finally, optimal SIC order scheduling was conjectured for the case of the high SNR regime.
APPENDIX A PROOF OF THEOREM 1
The process of the derivation for the secrecy outage probability of U k with the presence of E j on basis of ZF-SIC is shown as follows, The proof has been completed.
APPENDIX B PROOF OF THEOREM 2
Following the similar steps to Appendix A, the derivation of the secrecy outage probability regarding a single eavesdropper for MMSE-SIC is shown, where the binomial theorem is applied in the final step, and the function U (·, ·) is defined in (22) .
APPENDIX C PROOF OF THEOREM 3
Follow Appendix A and replace the PDF of ξ kj with that of ξ k in (28) . 
where (·, ·, ·, ·) is defined in (14) .
APPENDIX D PROOF OF THEOREM 4
Follow Appendix C and replace the CDF of γ 
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